It is widely believed that quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved unconditionally secure for realistic models applicable to various current experimental schemes. Here we summarize briey why this is not the case, from both the viewpoints of fundamental quantitative security and applicable models of security analysis, with some morals drawn.
INTRODUCTION
After the appearance of papers last year on fundamental QKD security [1] and the complete breach of concrete QKD systems [2] [3] , claims have persistently been made [4] that QKD is already proved unconditionally secure in principle in various models. However, ref [2] and its extensions [3, 5] highlight in a forceful manner the precarious situation of such widespread claims, especially on concrete experimental systems. Imagine the consequence if the Norway group kept their detector "blinding attacks" secret and makes them available to selected parties after a QKD systems has been deployed upon convincing the users its "unconditional" or whatever imposing security terminology that has been employed. The fact of the matter is that the security proofs of the models, assuming the deductions are totally valid (but they are actually not), contain general and specic assumptions that are simply not satised in practice. Moreover, the security criteria themselves used in the proofs do not guarantee proper security when satised. This paper tries to outline the underlying reasons, and indicates some ways to deal with the situation.
SECURITY IS NOT MERELY A MATTER OF DEFINITION
Thus far a single-number criterion on a single quantity has been used as the security criterion in QKD security proofs, from mutual information to trace distance. However, in accord with detection theory an attacker Eve would obtain from the measurement result on her probe a whole probability distribution {q j }, j ∈ 1, . . . , M for the M = 2 m possible values of an m-bit data X from which an n-bit nal key K is drawn after the use of an error correction code (ECC) and a privacy amplication code (PAC). Since PAC is a known hash function, this distribution {q j } X leads to the distribution {p i } on K, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. A bound on the mutual information or any single-number criterion on X or K merely expresses a constrain on {q j } or {p j }.
Since one is using K as if it is uniformly distributed to Eve, i.e., with probability 1 N for the N possible key values, one must bound the dierence between the probability 2 |K| of a uniformly distributed subset of size |K| and Eve's optimum probability p E 1 (K) of estimatingK correctly in any attack to be below a prescribed
When ε(K) can be made suciently small, condition (1) gives K the information =theoretic (IT) "semantic security" required for meaningful "unconditional security". Thus, good security demands semantic security that may not be obtainable quantitatively from another criterion, especially a single-number criterion that is not bounded tightly enough. Security is a quantitative issue. It is also not a mere mathematical issue for which one can adopt whatever mathematical denition that seems intuitively suitable. In particular, it must be expressed by Eve's success probabilities of correctly estimating various properties of K which can all be derived from (1).
Eve can try to estimate K from just its generation process, the resulting security of K is called "raw security" to be distinguished from its "composition security" when K is actually used. General composition security is a complicated matter and we will just restrict our attention to the case when K is used for encryption, say in the one-time pad format often suggested. In such situation part of K may be revealed to
Eve in a known-plaintext attack (KPA), which may help her nd the rest of K and thus nd the rest of the data unknown to Eve at the beginning, which is encrypted by K to yield the ciphertext. Security against such leakage of K will be called "KPA security".
It is important to note that proof of semantic KPA security is necessary for any claim of unconditional security on K to be used for encryption. This is because the use of conventional symmetric key ciphers for key expansion also gives raw information theoretic (IT) security, and thus they, not RSA, are the appropriate conventional ciphers one should compare QKD to. This is a fair comparison because the use of a shared secret key for message authentication during key generation is necessary, though not included thus far in the security analysis of any QKD protocol. (KCQ protocols [6] use a shared secret key explicitly.) In addition, the raw security of such conventional ciphers is far better than that of concrete QKD systems that have been studied experimentally or theoretically. The superiority of concrete QKD must lie in its KPA security, which is the usual security concern because the shared secret key is typically totally hidden when the data X is uniform to Eve.
PROBLEMS OF THE MUTUAL INFORMATION CRITERION
Eve's accessible information on K from her attack is the most commonly used security criterion, so far the only one used in all experimental schemes. It is Eve's mutual information I E with respect to K under optimal measurement on her probe. Information or entropy expresses a constraint on Eve's estimate on the whole distribution {p j } she may get from the measurement result on her probe. It has been repeatedly pointed out [7, 8, 1] that there are distributions consistent with a given I E such that her maximum probability p 1 of estimating the whole key K correctly is given by
Thus, unless l ∼ n, the raw security of K so guaranteed may be quite inferior to a uniform key. The other subsetsK of K suer similarly. The practical values of I E obtained in experimental schemes indeed gives very large p 1 in this sense [1, 8] .
Under KPA, knowing some bits of K does not render the rest of K more insecure if E has no quantum memory [1] . If Eve does have quantum memory, possible locking information would render K insecure [9] or even very insecure [10] . In fact, the latter can be understood from (2) as follows. The bits on K gained in a KPA could reduce the exponent of p 1 in (2). Indeed, it only takes
number of bits to change p 1 to the value 1 when Eve measures on her probe with this added information on K. Thus, poor raw security of K is intimately connected to its poor KPA security when Eve possesses quantum memory. This important point was not yet noticed in ref [1] .
The variational distance
between Eve's probability distribution {p i } on K averaged over K averaged over K and the uniform distribution U of n bits has quantitative behavior similar to I E . In particular, when p 1 is large compared to
could give a p 1 as big as the case of δ E = I E N , i.e. the value of (2). Thus, the same problem occurs under KPA as in the case of an I E criterion above. When δ E ≤ ε = 2 −l with l ∼ n , semantic security is obtained which is, however, still not the true fundamental security in the quantum case. See section V.
PROBLEMS OF THE TRACE DISTANCE CRITERION
The trace distance quantum criterion
between two density operators ρ 1 and ρ 2 says that the variational distance between the two distributions P and Q obtained in a measurement as derived from ρ 1 and ρ 2 satises δ(P, Q) ≤ ε. Let ρ k E be the state of Eve's probe when the actual K has value k. Then (5) says, with ρ 1 = ρ k E and ρ 2 = ρ U the uniform mixed state with rank N, that for any measurement Eve may make on her probe she has δ E ≤ ε. The problem of such a security criterion is indicated through δ E above.
for a joint state ρ KE , is used [12] with the interpretation that when d = , it means K equals U with probability 1 − ε to Eve and the value k also becomes independent of ρ k E . This implies "universal composability" including security against KPA. In ref [1] it has been analyzed in detail why this interpretation cannot be true with any probability. We can describe the reason simply as follows.
The main error arises from conclusion in ref [11] that δ(P, Q) = implies P and Q are the same distribution with probability 1 − ε. This conclusion was derived from the existence of a joint distribution D that gives P and Q as marginal and yields the above interpretation. Why would this D arise in the cryptosystem? In fact, even when a joint distribution dierent from the product form P Q is in force, why would it be this particular (which is actually the optimal) one for the interpretation to obtain. In reality, one is simply comparing two distributions and the joint distribution should be P Q. It is indeed clear directly from the denition of δ(P, Q) that P and Q must dier when δ(P, Q) = ε > 0.
Sometimes the term failure probability is used [12, 13] without explicitly saying what that means. In [14] it is shown that ε does not itself have a probability interpretation. Thus, it is not any failure probability. A related source of this error, which was not discussed in ref [1] , is a misinterpretation of a notion of ε-indistinguishable measure. It is concluded [13] from (5) that ρ 1 and ρ 2 is ε-indistinguishable and thus the protocol has failure probability ≥ 1−ε. The problem of ε-indistinguishable for KPA security guarantee is a quantitative one similar to (2)-(3) above. A detailed explanation of the whole situation is given in [14] . A specic example showing the drastic failure of d and Iac is given in [15] . In particular, a new and apparently dicult to handle criterion d needs to be used in place of d for KPA security,
where N (ρ E ) is the dimension of the range of ρ E .
TRUE KEY GENERATION RATE AND LIMITATION OF PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
It is important to observe that Eve's maximum probability q 1 on the data X is equal to her p 1 on K, and that p 1 cannot be be improved by further PA. This is because a known transformation from ECC+PAC would just bring the most likely value of the data or key to a nal value of K with the same probability. On the other hand, it is clear from (2) that the rate of semantically secure key generation is limited to l n . Thus, unconditionally secure key generation rate cannot be given by what has been asserted in the literature, but is determined via the p 1 exponent. Moreover, this rate is determined by q 1 and we just saw it cannot be improved via PA. Also, from (3) above, PAC cannot improve the basic KPA security when Eve has quantum memory. See [6, 14] for further elaboration.
In nite protocols -no real protocol operates in the asymptotic limit n → ∞ it makes little sense to say a quantity grows exponential in n without some estimate of the actual convergence rate, because any value can be written as exponential in n. It is more accurate to just say that l semantically secure bits are generated in the round. For concrete protocols l is very small thus far and could not cover the message authentication bits used in any normal IT-secure authentication scheme, while the situation is unlikely to change [1, 7] .
TRUE SECURITY AND ASYMPTOTIC PROOF
Note that even with PA to extract semantically secure bits from the p 1 exponent, fundamental security has not been guaranteed. The use of Markov Inequality to convert an average guarantee to a probable individual guarantee would just reduce the quantitative value that has been achieved. Much more signicantly, Eve could launch an optimal quantum attack on specic subsetK of K which, because of quantum mechanics, can be superior to what she may obtain by attacking the whole K.
In this connection, it is important to point out that the asymptotic limit that so many security proofs are based upon both overestimate what the users can achieve and what Eve can achieve in a nite situation. This is clear information theoretically, because all the "capacity" like statements involving mutual information are well known to be limiting capabilities. For example, the actual "random coding exponent" or channel reliability function [16] for nite n, similar to the p 1 , exponent, is what controls nite system performance, not the capacities. This applies to both the users and Eve, and is overlooked also in the classical literature on key generation. Basically, cryptographers should be working with detection theory, not information theory, for ascertaining performance by any party. Probability has operational interpretation and is what matters IT wise (but IT in the broad sense), not any other theoretical quantity like mutual information that needs to be translated back to probability as done in ref [1, 7] . This last point is very important. It shows the possibility of secure key generation is not determined by any capacity statement. Indeed, the possibility of KCQ (keyed communication in quantum noise) [7] depends on such more limited ability of Eve, no coding or indenitely large n but just optimum decision on a nite-n system. Quantum information locking may help signicantly for KCQ but it is not necessary.
Some details and further elaboration on sections II-VI can be found in [14, 15] .
GRAVE EFFECT OF LOSS ON SECURITY
Real optical systems have signicant loss. If the transmission loss is small one can treat deleted bits as random errors. Security claim was often made with loss taken into account just on the throughput via post-detection selection of the detected events. That this is clearly not a valid inference could be seen from the situation of B92, for which security is totally breached in an intercept-resend attack when the loss is above a certain threshold determined by the two signal states, or in any coherent-state BB84 protocol [17] .
Generally, the users may try to reduce loss by pre-detection as indicated in Fig. 1 , with success probability itself limited by the loss. Examples include QND measurement and herald qubit amplier . However, Eve also has a similar attack approach, the probabilistic re-send (PRS) attack indicated in Fig. 2 . Sucient loss would allow her to cover the deleted bits in principle and often in practice also. PRS attacks include probabilistic approximate cloning which is itself a generalization of the attack in ref [17] that is equivalent to probabilistic exact cloning. Note that the possibility of bit deletion from loss violates the usual informationdisturbance tradeo that underlines QKD security, in that information can be gained by Eve without causing any relevant disturbance.
While PRS attacks can be covered in a suciently general formulation on Eve's probe, it is not automatically covered by merely bringing up the possible use of post-detection selection [18] , QND measurement or squashing [19] [20] , or heralded qubit amplier [21] . Indeed, it does not seem a security proof covering all possible PRS attacks in signicant loss has ever appeared. The analysis of ref [22] includes detector ineciency but not transmission loss. Absorbing transmission loss in the detector eciency with ρ i replaced by a state without loss is the same as post-detection selection, in addition to yielding a possibly very small detector eciency. Note that there is no complete security proof in loss even just under individual attack.
This grave consequence of loss on security has been pointed out previously in [8] , and further elaborated in [23] . Figure 1 . Schematic way to eliminate or reduce the eect of loss by user: loss is alleviated or eliminated with favorable pre-detection outcome.
U
U U Figure 2 . Schematic way to take advantage of loss by attacker: a more favorable input state ρ f from Eve's viewpoint is sought with possible quantum signal detection (PRS attack).
PROBLEMS OF MODELING VERSUS SIDE CHANNEL
There are two kinds of mathematical modeling problems in QKD security analysis of concrete systems:
(A) whether the model includes typical general features of a real cryptosystem; (B) whether the operative assumptions of the security analysis are satised in the real system it is applied to.
As an example of (A), the quantum signal state space in any QKD implementation is never a qubit but an innite-dimensional boson mode. That a dierent dimension from two may breach security is clearly brought out in a specic example [24] . The situation of loss is discussed above. Thus, all qubit-based security proof is not directly applicable to a real system, but such security claim was often made on the basis of qubit proofs.
There are many examples of (B), such as the use of threshold detector or Poisson source model for lasers without phase randomization. Much more signicant are the time-shift attack [25] based on detector eciency mismatch [26] and the blinding attacks [2] [3] 5] . Detector eciency mismatch has been dealt with in ref [18] . What is unsettling about the time-shift attack is that the detailed detection mechanism in the detector can be exploited to lead to a huge mismatch. The blinding attacks (based on detector controllability by Eve more essentially than faked state) is even more unsettling, because it does not lead to any common detector imperfection representation and relies on the internal detector electronic behavior. While the particular possibility of detector blinding can be added in a security analysis [27] , it is not clear how one would know all the relevant internal electronics behavior have been included in any particular model. Some discussion on similar but more general modeling question can be found in ref [28] . Note that Fig. 2 can be used to represent timing and blinding attacks, when the input state itself is already faked in a specic way by Eve and the detector electronic behavior and total system loss may together allow an attack to succeed.
In this connection, it may be pointed out that this is not a "side channel" issue as it is the case with the RSA timing attack. Side channels can be closed once and forever, but the detector in a QKD system is an integral part of the receiver one must have, part of the "main channel". For example, if a detector leaks radiation of dierent characteristics depending on the incoming state, it can be sealed and thus the leak is a side channel. But the detection mechanism is not a side channel. Another point is that a side channel would not aect the original cryptosystem representation, surely the case also for the RSA timing attack. However, the system model has to be extended to include the time-shift attack and blinding attack [27] . To what extent must one model the internal behavior of a detector, or any system component, so that the resulting security analysis captures all the relevant features of the cryptosystem, instead of getting new surprises from time to time? If this question is not settled there will be no security proof for any concrete QKD system even just in principle, whatever else one may have achieved. The detector representation problem goes beyond (B) and squarely to (A) above, an issue of completeness of the cryptosystem model.
There are other systems that are not subject to such detector based attacks, including continuous variable QKD which is, however, not yet proved secure according to the standard view in the literature [13] . The KCQ approach [7] is also immune to such attacks, especially Y00 in any of the formats (PSK, ISK, QAM) that have been studied, because there is essentially no deleted bit. However, general IT security has not been established for any KCQ protocol. 10 . OUTLOOK Security is a serious matter and cannot be established experimentally. We see in the above that, just in principle, fundamental quantitative security has not been properly addressed in QKD security analysis and the eect of loss has not been properly accounted for. The widespread perception of proven QKD security is based on several omission or errors of reasoning:
(i) No proven security against known-plaintext attack when the generated key K is used for encryption; (ii) Use of single-number constraint on the attacker's probability distribution on K when the number is not or cannot be bounded tightly enough; The situation is summarized in the following There are two ways to deal with these problems. The rst is to limit one's claim, for example to knownplaintext attacks with no quantum memory. One can, say, wait an hour before using the generated key. One can ignore joint attacks that require entanglement across modes either in the probe or in the measurement.
The resulting KPA security appears provable for at least KCQ protocols and would still represents major progress beyond what can be obtained with standard ciphers. In any case it is better to avoid misleading terminology like "unconditional", "no signaling", and "device independent". Generally, a more careful and critical attitude in making security claim would be appropriate. The second way is to look for new approaches or major modication of existing ones. In particular, we need a general proof that device internal electronics cannot lead to security loopholes in the protocol.
